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8
Recovering the Performative Role
of Innovations in the Global
Travel of Healthcare Practices
Is there a Ghost in the Machine?
Davide Nicolini, Jeanne Mengis, David Meacheam,
Justin Waring, and Jacky Swan
CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discusses the global travel of practices with reference to the international
patient safety movement, focusing on a speciﬁc approach to incident investigation
(Root Cause Analysis or RCA for short). We assess how knowledge of the technique was
mobilized, from the United States to Australia, the United Kingdom and beyond. We
argue that the mobilization and world spanning circulation of this set of practices was
sustained and facilitated by the construction of an “anxiety-reassurance” package. This
package worked to support the mobilization of the approach through, ﬁrst, raising
public and professional anxiety about pre-existing management practices around
patient safety, and second, creating reassurance by proposing a new management
solution to solve this problem. Playing together these two seemingly opposite dis-
courses, the innovation generated a wave of interest and urgency that it then rode and
that allowed rapid globalization. Below we show how this powerful “package” actively
translated the new approach in the sense of both circulating and profoundly reconﬁg-
uring it. We suggest that a focus on the innovation as a well-oiled piece of discursive
machinery helps us “unpack the black box,” and understand the active role of innov-
ations in fueling their own translation. This without reverting to the old idea that
innovations are “diffused.”
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8.1 Introduction
For the most part of the twentieth century, academics and policy makers alike
endorsed the view that modes of organizing, practices, and ideas diffuse
within a population or ﬁeld through a more or less mindless process of
contagion, usually described using the chemical image of diffusion (Rogers,
1995; Strang and Soule, 1998; Van de Ven and Hargrave, 2004). The idea of
innovation and policy diffusion is based on a rational communication model
and draws on the implicit principle that the knowledge is transmitted
unchanged; the success of the innovation depends on the ﬁt between the
nature of the sender, the object that is translated, and the receivers. Adopters
are often depicted as passive; the focus is on responsive adaptive behavior; the
engine behind the diffusion of innovations is assumed to be either the acqui-
sition of a competitive advantage or normative compliance (Johnson and
Hagström, 2005).
From the 1990s this under-socialized, scarcely performative view of the
circulation and take-up of new knowledge, practices and modes of organizing
was problematized by a number of studies which confronted diffusion theory
to posit the existence of a “ghost in the machine”1 and brought to attention
the active role of adopters in the process of innovation (Latour, 1986;
Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996; Strang and
Soule, 1998; Johnson and Hagström, 2005; Frenkel, 2005; Czarniawska and
Sevón, 2005a; Boxenbaum and Battilana, 2005; Morris and Lancaster, 2006;
Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac, 2010; Nicolini, 2010). Con-
trary to the prevailing diffusionist view, the Sociology of Translation suggested
that the circulation2 and take-up of innovations is better understood as a
social and political process through which new ways of working actively
“carve out” a space within the existing texture of practices. This is achieved
by a process that allows them to become associated with a variety of different
interests and goals. The more interests and goals a new practice or innovation
can serve and mobilize, the more irresistible it will become. The model derives
from a strong semiotic, material, and political orientation to social affairs and
is based on three main claims (Latour, 1986).
Firstly, practices, policies, and modes of organizing do not actually travel
and always require some type of intermediary to move in space and time.
Such intermediation is usually discursive and symbolic in character. In short,
it is not practices or ways of doing which travel but rather their descriptions
or representations. Practice, policies, and institution are thus turned into
texts, ideas, models, images, drawings, narratives, examples, and so on,
which are circulated far away from the point of origin. Practices, policies,
and ways of working can also be inscribed in human bodies and minds, in
the form of skills and competences. In this case humans become themselves
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intermediaries. Finally, in certain circumstances material objects like proto-
types, software, and other artifacts can also be used to convey the idea of a
practice, policy, or particular new ways of working. From a research point of
view the key empirical question is not only how a practice moves in space
and time but how one particular new way of doing becomes relevant and
compelling given that we are continuously surrounded by endless new ideas
and possibilities.
Secondly, and strictly related to the former, the movement in space and
time of any new knowledge, practice, or mode of organizing, is in the hands
of those involved. They may accept it, modify it, deﬂect it, betray it, add to
it, appropriate it, or let it drop (Latour, 1986: 267). The impetus must
thus come from the potential users themselves who must perceive some
beneﬁts from the adoption of this new way of working. Each of these actors
shapes the innovation to their own ends. Instead of a process of transfer
and transmission, we have thus a process of continuous transformation
(Latour, 1986).
Thirdly, because there are always several possible competing interpret-
ations of any new way of doing things, each serving a particular type of
interest, the translation process should always be regarded as a political task
that takes place within speciﬁc institutional constraints and power dynam-
ics. Organizational ﬁelds are thus the locus of tactics, strategic action, and
conﬂict (Waring and Currie, 2009). Translating innovation is always tied to
the local pursuit of speciﬁc material or immaterial interests. The receivers
and (potential) adopters of innovations are thus not only active, they are
politically savvy.
From the perspective of the Sociology of Translation, focusing on the
characteristics of the innovation and its presumed innovativeness makes
little sense and the process of translation, rather than the properties of
innovative ways of organizing and practices, needs to be the focus of “dif-
fusion” studies (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996: 25). Innovations travel
fueled mostly by the need (or desire) of actors to imitate others while
pursuing their own speciﬁc interests (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Czar-
niawska and Sevón, 2005b). Accordingly, studies in this tradition have
traditionally focused on the micro-tactics and broader processes whereby
interests are organized, movements created and innovations propelled (see
Boxenbaum and Pedersen, 2009 for a review). However, while the previous
studies documented the journey of innovative ideas and how they are made
to change in the process (Ansari, Fiss, and Zajac, 2010) innovations were
seen mostly as rather inert intermediaries that human individual or collect-
ive agents passed to each other. The performative power of the innovation
itself was downplayed or ignored, being perceived as belonging to the alter-
native (i.e. diffusion) paradigm.
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In this chapter we argue that by doing so the Sociology of Translation
missed a chance to add a few more mediators in the world (Latour’s battlecry
is “more mediators and less intermediaries” see Latour, 2005: 37 and ff.) The
difference between intermediation and mediation is subtle but important.
Intermediaries are mediums, neutral carriers (Latour, 1994: 31). They have
limited or no inﬂuence on the nature of the message or what has been
exchanged. Mediation, on the other hand, implies displacement, drift, inven-
tion, and “the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some
degree modiﬁes two elements or agents” (Latour, 1994: 31). This often
requires that themessage or the thing that is exchanged is modiﬁed to become
more acceptable to both parties. At the end of a process of mediation both
parties will end up in places that were different from where they started.
Mediators are thus by deﬁnition active and consequential both on the
exchange and what is exchanged.
We argue that in speciﬁc circumstances the innovation itself should be
included in the explanation of its success—the innovation is a mediator in
its own right. This is not because of its supposed inherent innovativeness (as
in the traditional diffusion approach) but more simply because certain innov-
ations, especially complex process innovations, are engineered to perform
a speciﬁc type of (discursive) work that contributes to translation, diffusion
and success. In the case of Root Cause Analysis (RCA)—a set of practices,
tools and skills to investigate the origin of serious clinical incidents, the
innovation itself operated as a capable, heterogeneous assemblage of human
and non-human elements that actively contributed to create the context for
its adoption. The package of discursive resources, tools and people (Nicolini,
Waring, and Mengis, 2011) worked together to support the spread of the
approach, ﬁrst, by raising public and professional anxiety about the perform-
ance of pre-existing practices around patient safety, and second, by creating
reassurance through proposing a newmanagement solution to solve the crisis
it had artfully created. By playing together these two seemingly opposite
discourses, the innovation package generated a wave of interest and urgency
that it then rode and that allowed its fast global circulation. For once, the
ghost is in the machine.
This chapter is organized as follows. After brieﬂy summarizing our
research methods and context, we describe the journey whereby RCA
was translated from one discipline to another and then proceeded to jump
from continent to continent until it became a global phenomenon. We
then zoom in on the nature of RCA and unpack its strategies and the
language employed when invoking its use that explain its performative
capability. We conclude by framing our ﬁndings within the broader discus-
sion on the translation, transition, and transmission of knowledge across
time and space.
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8.2 Context and Methods
Our research style is based on analytic narratives (Bates et al., 2000) and
process tracing (George and Bennett, 2005). Theory-guided process-tracing
approaches generate explanatory models based on a limited number of his-
torical cases.
We conducted twenty-six semi-structured interviews and a comprehensive
documentary analysis in the USA, Australia, and the UK. We chart here
the travel of the idea and practice of RCA (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996;
Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005a; Nicolini, 2010), examining how it was
adopted as the dominant approach to learn from incidents and improve safety
in the UK, Australia, and elsewhere.
Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Two of the authors then
proceeded to create a time-ordered matrix and a number of process-event
charts, working inductively to identify clear recurring patterns in the data
(Levi, 2002).
8.2.1 What is RCA?
Root Cause Analysis refers to a family of structured methodologies for the
retrospective and structured investigation of adverse incidents, near misses
and sentinel events. It is aimed at helping organizations learn from their
mistakes (Wald and Shojania, 2001). RCA is based on the belief that in order
to prevent accidents from recurring an interdisciplinary team has to inquire
not only how the event happened, but what are its underlying systemic causes
to formulate corrective actions (Carroll, Rudolph, and Hatakenaka, 2002).
RCA promises that organizational problems and the solutions to these prob-
lems can be identiﬁed through robust, rigorous, and rational analytical pro-
cesses (Andersen and Fagerhaug, 2000).
As a process, RCA ﬁts within a wider model of organizational learning that
involves stages for knowledge sharing through incident reporting, stratiﬁca-
tion of incidents to determine their relative priority, structured investigation
to determine the underlying causes and producing recommendations and
service improvements to promote future safety (Nicolini, Waring, and
Mengis, 2011). RCA is based on a rational choice approach to problem solving
(March, 1994) and a linear view of organizational change (see, for example,
Weick and Quinn, 1999). The ideal RCA process is summarized in Table 8.1.
While variations of this model exist (Bagian et al., 2002; Woloshynowych
et al., 2005), there remains an enduring commitment to following a linear
analytical framework (Runciman and Walton, 2007). The broad consensus is
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that RCA represents an umbrella or toolbox of approaches rather than a single
method (Andersen and Fagerhaug, 2000: 12).
Woloshynowych et al. (2005) report that more than forty RCA techniques
are available, including brainstorming, cause-effect charts, change analysis,
“ﬁve whys” diagrams, fault trees, and Gantt charts, providing different levels
and forms of analysis at different stages of the investigation. Two examples of
RCA are provided in Table 8.2.
8.3 Findings: The Global Travel of RCA
8.3.1 The Origins: Jumping Industry Boundaries
The modern version of RCA has its roots in the nuclear branch of the US Navy
where the approach was developed as a tool to guarantee high standards of
performance and reliability. After the Three Mile Island incident (1979), and
Table 8.1. An ideal model of the RCA process (from Amo, 1998)
The seven steps for Root Cause Analysis
1. Identify the incident to be analyzed
2. Organize a team to carry out the RCA
3. Study the work processes
4. Collect the facts
5. Search for causes
6. Take action
7. Evaluate the actions taken.
Table 8.2. Root Cause Analysis in practice
What is the focus of RCA investigations?
The following is an example of a root cause analysis conducted within a Victorian (Australian) public
hospital. A suicidal patient admitted to inpatient care concealed medication previously prescribed and
attempted suicide via overdose. The patient survived this attempt, but subsequently succeeded in
hanging themselves within the inpatient unit. The subsequent RCA investigation recommended
changes in the search procedures of patients’ belongings when admitted to care, revision of the
guidelines for care of suicidal patients and implementing an improved anti-ligature system for bathroom
doors/ﬁttings. (State Government Victoria, Department of Health, 2014)
How does RCA work in practice?
At one of the hospital we observed in the UK the “RCA” described a facilitated group session held in one
of the departments in order to further investigate and discuss an untoward accident with serious
consequences for a patient. Participation was strongly encouraged but not mandatory. Usually about a
dozen people attended. Statements were collected ahead of the meeting and a timeline carefully
constructed. The facilitator used the incident timeline to trigger and structure a conversation in search of
immediate and root causes. Other tools were utilized to give depth to the discussion, for example a
ﬁshbone analysis of contributory factors. At the end of the session the facilitators usually identiﬁed some
of the “good practices” that emerged during the discussion as well as some of the lesson learned and
areas that required change. A report summarizing the discussion and action point was then sent to the
hospital management for approval.
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subsequent enquiry, RCA was widely adopted by civilian and military nuclear
industry establishments (Carroll, 1998; Wears, Perry, and Sutcliffe, 2005).
Seminal publications on RCAwere written by nuclear industry experts. During
the 1980s and 1990s, safety professionals—usually engineers—extended the
method into other industries. By the mid-1990s RCA was a cemented part of
the general body of knowledge for safety professionals.
8.3.2 RCA Conquers the US Healthcare Sector
In the USA, the use of a structured method to investigate incidents was
introduced in healthcare in the mid-1990s through the jointed and sometime
disjointed efforts of two large agencies—the Joint Commission for Accredit-
ation of Hospitals (“the Joint Commission”) and the Veterans Health Affairs
Administration (VHA) (Wears, Perry, and Sutcliffe, 2005).
The Joint Commission is an independent, not-for-proﬁt organization formed
by the merger of the largest medical associations in North America. Its primary
purpose is to evaluate and provide voluntary accreditation to healthcare organ-
izations. The VHA provides medical services for US armed forces veterans and
their families. It is government funded and is the largest integrated healthcare
system in the USA, serving 8.3 million customers per annum.
Both organizations became sensitized to the issue of patient safety following
the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Brennan et al., 1991). The study exam-
ined 30,121 randomly selected records from ﬁfty-one randomly selected hos-
pitals and found that adverse events occurred in 3.7 percent of the cases (1,114
patients). In 13.6 percent of cases this lead to death (151 cases). Almost one
quarter of these incidents were due to negligence.
Following the publication of the report the Joint Commission introduced
an “agenda for change,” including a system of voluntary reporting of critical
incidents. Informants described this as highly ineffective. Under increased
media attention and the report of a string of horror stories coming out of
accredited hospitals, in 1995 the Joint Commission considered a punitive
response, withdrawing accreditation from “error” hospitals. According to
one of our informants, this policy was abandoned in favor of a more develop-
mental approach promoted by Rick Croteau, a former NASA doctor proﬁcient
in using engineering techniques to investigate accidents and prevent their
reoccurrence. Croteau, as director of the Joint Commission strategic initiative
on preventing clinical errors, promoted a policy requiring all hospitals to
investigate and report the causes of the most serious adverse events (“sentinel
events”) so that the Joint Commission could conduct cross hospital analysis
and make recommendations for change. The Joint Commission developed
a detailed deﬁnition of sentinel events and promoted the use of “Focus
Reviews,” a team based exercise modeled on Quality Circles (one of our
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informants described this as “RCA under a different name”). Conducting the
Focus Reviews was voluntary (the Joint Commission did not have enforcing
power), member organizations were motivated to adopt the practice as
accreditation status would not be changed if a review was conducted. The
Joint Commission however could only recommend but not prescribe how
such reviews were to be conducted.
Concurrently, the VHA was following a similar path and in the early 1990s
established a Patient Safety Event Registry. The process required that local
experts would conduct an investigation using ten structured questions. In
typical bureaucratic fashion, the report would then be sent to regional and
possibly national ofﬁces. According to our informants quality was poor and
the question usually attractingmost attention was whether the incident could
have adverse public relations effects.
Evolution hastened in the mid-1990s, when the VHA employed Jim Bagian,
an ex-astronaut and safety expert at NASA. He was brought in to guide the
newly established Patient Safety Improvement initiative, later to become the
VHA National Centre for Patient Safety. Bagian’s initial actions included estab-
lishing an Expert Panel on Patient Safety System Design with a mix of VHA
employees and experts from aviation, safety engineering and psychology. The
panel proposed a set of recommendations to guide the VHA attempt to improve
their safety record. They examined the reporting systems used in aviation and
aeronautics and in 1997 produced a series of recommendations aimed at estab-
lishing a mandatory, non-punitive system of investigation and reporting
focused on learning rather than apportioning blame. At the core of the
approach was RCA, understood as a structured, team based method of incident
investigation that would feed the improvement process. The approach was
formalized in the 1998 “VHA Patient Safety Improvement Handbook,” now
in its third iteration. At the same time, the two organizations (and others not
mentioned here for brevity’s sake but which constituted an emerging commu-
nity of interest), started tomeet and exchange notes. In 1996 and 1998 the two
organizations gathered several hundred experts at the Annenberg Conferences
where the Joint Commission shared the lessons learned through the sentinel
event program while the VHA discussed their approach to learning from errors.
Matters took a further dramatic turn in 1999 with the publication of the
Institute of Medicine report “To err is human.” The report replicated on a
wider scale the Harvard Medical Practice Study and came to the striking
conclusion that about 98,000 people die each year in US hospitals as a result
of preventable medical errors. As one of our informants put it:
. . . the report changed the opinion of a lot of people . . . From then on people could
not say that medical malpractice was not a serious problem . . . this served to put the
issue of patient safety, which previously had been invisible, on the radar screen.
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Patient safety had been turned into a social problem (Kitsuse and Spector,
1973). One outcome of the report was the joint development of a Safety
Assessment Code (SAC) Matrix for close calls and adverse events, bringing
together the classiﬁcations used by the VHA and the Joint Commission.
Following the publication of the report, the VHA also sped up the roll out of
RCA as the main approach to learn from incidents. How RCA was to be
conducted in all VHA facilities, the tools to be used, when and by whom,
were codiﬁed in a new version of the Handbook issued in 2000. This included
diagrams, instructions on how to conduct the investigation, who was to be
involved, how remedial actions were to be formulated. The initiative was a
resounding success:
We started out with less than 10% of our facilities volunteering to try this, less
than 10%. In less than a month from that 10% starting to do it, the gossip mill, if
you will—the conversations they would have with their colleagues . . . every other
facility was demanding to do it immediately, and that’s not an exaggeration . . .
I had calls or emails from every director saying, “How come we are not doing this
already? When do we get to start doing this?” which is a good problem to have.
(Interviewee)
Concurrently, Bagian visited the Joint Commission, presented the VHA
approach and showed their materials. Soon after, Dennis O’Leary, head of
the Joint Commission, publicly conﬁrmed that new Joint Commission policy
was to be based on VHA’s handbook for Patient Safety.
The march of RCA now was irresistible. In 2002 stakeholders across the
public and private sector establish the National Quality Forum and created
the ﬁrst list of “never events” (very serious incidents that should never hap-
pen), and monitored their occurrence. In 2005 the Department of Health and
Human Services started a national network of Patient Safety Organizations
that collected and analyzed voluntary reports of adverse events. In both cases,
RCA was identiﬁed as the main tool to investigate incidents, produce change,
and address “the underlying system of care deﬁciencies” (Andersen and
Fagerhaug, 2000).
Members of the two organizations differ on who should be credited for the
success of the RCA.Members of the Joint Commission suggested that the VHA
version of the RCA was just a modiﬁcation of what they had been doing for
almost two decades. The VHA claims that they should be credited for the
introduction of engineering rigor and discipline:
[At the Joint Commission] nobody knew how to do investigations. They would sit
down together and look at it and say, “well, yeah, the nurse should try harder,” or
“I do not know, that’s just a normal complication; patients died, but that just
happens.” So 50% of the time they get to the end saying “that just happened”
while the other 50% was “try harder” or give them some training. (Interviewee)
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VHA staff are happy to acknowledge that the Joint Commission had a critical
role in themainstreaming of RCA “Wewere acting as providers, and they were
really the government oversight althoughwe also had CMS,3 which is another
government [agency] . . .There’s no end of government oversight, but they
were the biggest of the oversight groups.” If the Joint Commission speaks, the
US hospitals listen.
8.3.3 RCA Crosses the Atlantic and Takes Root in the UK
As in the USA, institutionalized attention on patient safety in the UK started to
emerge in the 1990s, the dawn of what Power (2007) describes as the age of the
risk management of everything. Risk management has become a benchmark
of good governance for banks, hospitals and many other organizations. Since
the mid-1970s National Health Service (NHS) organizations were required to
apply the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, subsequently safety in health-
care was forcefully brought to the fore by a series of reports from the National
Audit Ofﬁce in the early 1990s. In a report from 1995, for example, the
National Audit Ofﬁce found that “hospitals are . . .dangerous places for
patients, staff and visitors” and that “the large number of accidents imposes
a very signiﬁcant burden on NHS resources which could be better spent on
patient care” (National Audit Ofﬁce, 1996).
Monitoring the occurrence of incidents was central to this approach. In
1991, the Department of Health (DoH) issued to all the local healthcare
authorities a suite of occupational health and safety tools (SAFECODE) includ-
ing IRIS, the ﬁrst standardized method to report incidents implemented in the
UK. The tool allowed monitoring the frequency of adverse events and pro-
vided the basis both for a number of government reports and the establish-
ment of the still existing Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts, a mandatory
internal insurance system. Premiums are calculated on the number of past
occurrences, with signiﬁcant discounts for organizations who can demon-
strate that they proactively try to prevent incidents. IRIS, however, was used
sporadically. As the 1995 National Audit Ofﬁce report put it “we consider it
unsatisfactory that, despite the NHS Executive’s previous guidance, many
hospitals do not have accident recording systems which provide accurate
and timely information.”
While the NHS was pursuing a traditional risk management approach,
culminating in 1999 with the adoption of the Australian Risk Management
Standard as the ofﬁcial NHS policy, others were following a different path. In
1995 academics and clinicians established a research unit on patient safety at
University College London. The group, led by Charles Vincent, tried to adapt
to the needs of healthcare settings the principles of the so called “human factor”
approach to incidents (Reason, 1995). “Human factors” utilizes systemic and
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psychological principles to identify the communicational, cultural and con-
textual reasons for the occurrence of adverse events. As a founding member
put it, one of the main concerns of the group was “how we could investigate
incidents more systematically and produce change.” While the government
was mainly interested in auditing the number of incidents, internal investi-
gations at the time were mainly used to apportion blame: “they hadmorbidity
and mortality meetings that junior doctors and the midwives used to hate
going to because they knew they were going to be hung, drawn and quartered”
(Interviewee).
The group produced the CRU/ALARM protocol, a structured method for
investigating clinical incidents using a combination of record review, staff
interviews and a human factors checklist highlighting psychological and
organizational factors (Vincent, Taylor-Adams, and Stanhope, 1998). Accord-
ing to an interviewee, while the protocol drew from a variety of sources, they
intentionally refrained from using the name RCA. This was because RCA was
perceived as a set of tools and approaches “that you apply when you are doing
a systematic incident investigation” rather than a protocol that can guide the
investigation. RCA was “just a label,” and possibly a confusing one. As our
informant stated “I think the people that were talking about Root Cause
Analysis at that time were probably not people who were experts in investi-
gation techniques.” The label was as intriguing as it was vague.
As in the USA, matters in the UK took a dramatic turn in the early 2000s
following yet another scandal. An inquiry conducted at Bristol Royal Inﬁrm-
ary in the late 1990s identiﬁed catastrophic systemic failures compounded
with a culture of secrecy and collusion that had led to the preventable death of
at least thirty children over ﬁve years. The resulting wave of indignation led to
an investigation into the NHS capacity to learn from incidents. The results
were damning. The authors of the report “An Organization with a Memory”
(DoH, 2000) candidly admitted that the NHS consistently failed to learn from
its errors. The experts recommended establishing a uniﬁed mechanism for
reporting incidents and for ensuring that where lessons were identiﬁed, the
necessary changes were put into practice. They also recommended that the
NHS promote a wider appreciation of the system approach in preventing and
learning from errors as well as a more open culture in which errors and service
failures could be reported and discussed.
One year later, the Department of Heath published a plan to address these
issues and implement the recommendations. The 2001 report “Building a
Safer NHS for Patients—Implementing an Organization with a Memory”
instituted explicit links between safety and clinical governance (de facto
putting managers and not clinicians in charge of patient safety); also estab-
lishing an arm’s length agency in charge of promoting patient safety (the
National Patient Safety Agency—NPSA) and set up a national repository for
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reported incidents (National Reporting and Learning System) modeled on the
existing Australian AIMS (see section 8.3.4). Finally, the report identiﬁed RCA
as “the more in-depth approach to identifying causal or systems factors in
more serious adverse events or near misses” (DoH, 2001: 37). Other home-
grown systems and protocols such as SAFECODE and the CRU/ALARM proto-
cols were ignored or subsumed under the RCA label.
Of particular interest here is that the report explicitly documents the inter-
national travel of RCA:
There are many approaches to root cause analysis used in healthcare and in other
industries. The Department of Health is participating in an Australian initiative to
review a range of approaches from different countries and produce guidance on
alternative methodologies that are directly relevant to healthcare. We will pilot
the results of this work during 2001 and issue guidance on root cause analysis.
(DoH, 2001: 38)
The “Key features of a thorough root cause analysis” discussed at page 37 of
the document are taken from a Joint Commission document, itself derived
from the VA handbook. The international links that contributed to the success
of RCA were conﬁrmed by other sources. Speaking at a conference after the
ﬁrst year of operations of the new National Patient Safety Agency, a director of
the Department of Health policy unit explained that:
Our preparations for this work began late last year by consulting experts in patient
safety both in the UK and abroad. Leading patient safety proponents like Bill
Runciman . . . and Jim Bagian . . .We have collaborated closely with: ECRI, the
Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF), the Centre for Patient Safety in
Chicago, the Hong Kong Hospital Authority, the US Veterans Health Administra-
tion, and with other bodies and individuals. (Knox, 2002: 230)
The conference served as the launch pad for the report “Doing less Harm”
(DoH, 2001). This established the policies and practices that were to be fol-
lowed by the largest public healthcare organization in the world, the NHS. The
document sanctioned the discursive equivalence between investigations and
RCA and translated previous approaches under the new label. Conference
organizer Stuart Emslie, inventor of SAFECODE, consultant to the Hong
Kong government and the NHS, explicitly reframed the ALARM protocol in
RCA terms, equating the two.
Not everyone was convinced by the wholesale adoption of the RCA vocabu-
lary, however. Two of the most prominent ﬁgures of the UCL group recall that
RCA (which they call a “misnomer”) became a “buzzword” at NPSA:
I can remember Jenny Dinner (a pseudonym), because when she was initially in
the post at the NPSA she gave me a call and said “do you know anything about this
root cause analysis stuff?”
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The informant recalls the moment when the label became institutionalized,
not so much in one of the many documents that, as we have seen above, the
NHS produces at a very fast rate, but in the discursive practices of the patient
safety community of practice:
Now how those “organization with a memory” people had come up with the
terminology of root cause analysis I don’t know . . .but when the ﬁrst cohort of
Patient SafetyManagers were trained [on how to conduct investigations] the terms
was institutionalized and cannot be recalled . . . the blind leading the blind.
8.3.4 The Burning Deck: RCA Travels Down Under
(and then Takes over the World)
Within Australia the provision of public health services is primarily the con-
cern of each of the separate eight states and territories. The story of the
penetration of RCA in Australia is therefore more complex than in the two
former cases. Here we recount what happened in three states: South Australia,
New South Wales, and Queensland, as the story of RCA in Australia is intim-
ately linked with—and in many ways similar to—the experience in the USA
and UK.
South Australia was an early administration where attention to clinical
incidents resulted in a co-ordinated attempt to record and monitor adverse
events. In themid-1980s a group of anaesthesiologists established a voluntary,
anonymous reporting system (Advanced Incident Management System)
which helps to collect and analyze detailed information about healthcare
incidents using a classiﬁcation based on most common adverse events. The
AIMS-Anaesthesia database gained national attention after a serious incident
with a vaporizer; clinicians identifying an array of problems with the equip-
ment, leading to new, clearer guidelines that became a national and later
international standard (Runciman, 2002; Øvretveit, 2005).
Quickly the AIMS system was expanded as a Federal initiative, to include
all other specialties, providing a large, centralized repository of information
on adverse events countrywide. With this data, and explicitly modelled
on the 1991 Harvard Study, clinicians found that 16.3–16.5 percent of
patients admitted to Australian hospitals experienced some sort of adverse
event, capturing both political and popular attention (Wilson et al., 1995).
A follow-up study found that about 50 percent of adverse events were
preventable (Wilson et al., 1999). While the studies were later disputed for
overestimating the extent of the problem they pushed patient safety to the
attention of the healthcare community. Critically, the study made clear that
reporting adverse events and doing something about them were two differ-
ent matters.
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As in the UK, the adoption of methods to actively learn from incidents—
rather than only learning about them, commonly followed what one of our
informants called “burning decks,” that is to say crises. In interview, the
generation of anxiety through the analogy of responding to the burning
deck of a ship was notable.
In New SouthWales that “burning deck” came with a series of accidents in a
regional health authority, where whistle-blowing nurses identiﬁed adverse
events in healthcare in local hospitals in the period leading up to a state
election. In the ensuing public debate, state political leaders sought to allocate
blame for what had been systemic public health system failures. Key health
bureaucrats saw the need for a process that focused on the problem-solving
aspect of RCA, rather than the allocation of blame.
Notably, one senior interviewee expressed a view that there was a pattern
of the New South Wales health bureaucracy adopting US-based innovations
“holus bolus” without consideration of its local appropriateness. For
example, the Quality and Safety Branch of New South Wales Health initiated
the adoption of RCA and a raft of other health quality techniques on the
basis that the same approach had been adopted by the US VHA. In particu-
lar, Dr Jim Bagian of the VHA was considered as highly inﬂuential in
the introduction of RCA, across Australia. According to our interviewees,
Bagian’s effectiveness springs from both his capacity to form effective rela-
tionships with key individuals, and his very persuasive use of stories.
Through these stories Bagian conveys the deep cultural and behavioral
patterns that underlie many medical accidents. The generally poor standards
of handwashing by health professionals are a ready instance of such cultural
and behavioral patterns.
In Queensland, the crisis came in 2005 when a Dr Patel at Bundaberg Public
Hospital was accused of presiding over a series of poor surgical outcomes,
including deaths. The event sped up the development of a State Patient Safety
Centre (established in 2004) and fast-tracked both the development of RCA in
Queensland and a more general patient safety management system. Drawing
on lessons learned during a fellowship with the VHA in the US, Dr Wakeﬁeld,
the local RCA champion, pushed forward the establishment of a comprehen-
sive system for improving patient safety, through learning from near misses
and adverse events. Rather than the blame-free emphasis of New SouthWales,
the recurrent theme within Queensland is upon a “just” process, linking back
to the original work of Jim Bagian and reﬂecting a preference for procedural
fairness and consistency and efforts to ensure transparency.
While, as noted above healthcare in Australia is primarily driven at the state
level, the invoking of RCA has been nationally driven. Today a central body,
the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, drives
patient safety measures at the national level.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 25/4/2016, SPi
Davide Nicolini et al.
190
Comp. by: Vasanthi Stage : Revises2 ChapterID: 0002675946 Date:25/4/16 Time:10:53:07
Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002675946.3d
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 191
Following the adoption of RCA in Australia, the method was embraced by
the World Health Organization. In 2004, the WHO launched The World
Alliance for Patient Safety, putting RCA at the heart of its global campaign
to promote patient safety. Training booklets on how to conduct RCA have
been translated in eight languages and are fully available on theWHOwebsite.
The training material is based on the methods developed by the VHA and the
UK National Patient Safety Agency (closed in 2011 as part of cost-cutting
measures). RCA is now a global phenomenon. A précis of the development
of RCA across the US, UK, and Australia is given Figures 8.1 and 8.2.
8.4 Analysis: An Ordinary Story of Translation—with a Twist
The story of RCA is in many ways an interesting yet quite “ordinary” case of
the circulation of new ideas at global scale. It has all the ingredients of a
translation rather than a diffusion story. First, RCA traveled carried by a variety
of human and non-human intermediaries. In order to do so, it had to be
abstracted from its original context, packaged in the form of documents,
accounts, and the stories of people such as Dr Bagian. It then had to be
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Figure 8.1 Chronology of the development of RCA in the USA, UK, and Australia
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unpacked in the different localities where it was translated. Our account here
is partly unique in that we could clearly trace which intermediary moved the
idea from place to place and when. Second, the process was clearly of a social
nature and in all cases we could clearly identify a number of (good) reasons
why the potential users could beneﬁt in adopting RCA and the personal,
political, and societal beneﬁts that would ensue from this. Finally, there is
ample evidence that the idea of RCA changed as it traveled (Ansari, Fiss, and
Zajac, 2010). As we have seen, RCA traveled by being translated over and over,
so that at any point in time RCA was the provisional outcome of more or less a
long series of prior translations, each critical for the idea to be adopted by a
new audience—and therefore its travel. In the process, the RCA label
“absorbed” a variety of pre-existing methods and protocols as it traveled
from the NASA Space Center to the Geneva ofﬁce of the WHO via the hos-
pitals of the VHA and the NHS.
These ﬁndings accord with previous studies on the social nature of the
circulation of innovation. The journey of RCA is similar to many of the trans-
lation stories recounted in Czarniawska and Sevón (2005a). In the case of RCA,
we found that the circulation of the new practice was particularly facilitated
by three concurrent circumstances: its theorization, interpretive ﬂexibility,
and its being sustained by a broad social network. First, authors have found
that when a new idea is theorized and turned by academics and consultants
into abstract models such as in Table 8.1, its capacity to travel around the
world is enhanced (Greenwood, Hinings, and Suddaby, 2002). Second, ambi-
guity and interpretive ﬂexibility are also well-known facilitators of circulation.
Interpretive ﬂexibility refers to the capacity for the innovation to be adapted
locally so that it can appeal to a variety of users (Scarbrough and Swan, 2001).
In our case, for example, because of its indeterminacy (“there are many
approaches to Root Cause Analysis used in healthcare and in other
Figure 8.2 The travel of RCA
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industries”) RCA can become the easy ﬁx to many woes and the solution to
many problems: accreditation, litigation, learning from medical adverse
events. Finally, the speciﬁc dynamics in the social network that may form
around an innovation also concur to determine its success (Scarbrough and
Swan, 2001). In our case, for example, the travel of RCA seems inextricably
linked to the emergence of a global network of people (and artifacts) that
together can be held responsible for its global circulation.
Clearly, at some point RCA also acquired the status of fashion (Abrahamson
and Rosenkopf, 1997; Hargadon, 2003). As we have shown above, both our
UK and Australian informants made it clear that at some point RCA had
become a “force majeure,” with organizations adopting it as a matter of
course. This happened despite strong voices against the mainstreaming
of this engineering approach to healthcare. For example, in 2004, a pioneer
of the CRU/ALARM protocol, the UK approach at ﬁrst sidelined and then
“digested” by RCA, wrote in the British Medical Journal that “ . . . the term
‘root cause analysis’, while widespread, is misleading in a number of respects”
(Vincent, 2004: 242). However, as his colleague noted, by then the term (and
its focus on presumed root causes that according to Vincent rarely exist) had
been institutionalized and could not be recalled in spite of its possible and
well-known shortcomings. In our research, interviewees reported that in some
instances of analysis, very minor case factors were exaggerated in an attempt
to satisfy the presumed need to identify a root cause when in practice the
adverse event had arisen from a combination of minor factors.
If one were to listen to some of our informants, most of the merit of the
success of RCA should be attributed to the human actors involved. Indeed,
during our interviews several of them described themselves in terms that
resonate with Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence’s (2004) deﬁnition of institu-
tional entrepreneurship (“activities of actors who have an interest in particular
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institu-
tions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence, 2004:
657)). While interviewees tried to convince us that RCA prevailed because it
was superior to the other methods (a sign that they had assimilated the
traditional narrative of diffusion theory), several of them seemed to be fully
aware of the political and opportunistic nature of some of the events that lead
to the global success of RCA. Yet the merit was all on the human side.
But is this conceivable? Was RCA really one innovation like all others? Was
its success down to just something being available to ﬁll the gap? There was
nothing intrinsically new or superior about RCA that could explain its success,
if nothing else because RCA had still to be tested in practice (and be found
lacking: see Nicolini, Waring, and Mengis, 2011 for an in-depth discussion).
Could there be other characteristics that can explain why RCAwas the best bet
and why the entrepreneurs went for it instead of some of the alternatives?
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What happens if we open the black box of RCA and we treat it as an (active)
source of performativity rather than simply an intermediary that allowed
humans to align and pursue their interest?
8.4.1 Opening the Black Box: RCA as an Anxiety-Reassurance
(Discursive) Package
We argue that part of the success of RCA can be explained by some of its
particular characteristics, chieﬂy the way in which RCA is presented. RCA
constitutes more than a simple toolkit to investigate incidents. In all coun-
tries we examined RCA; it was introduced as a complex discursive package
built around the conﬂict between anxiety and reassurance. This package
concomitantly highlighted and ampliﬁed the uncertainty and dangers of
the medical practice and offered a reassuring solution in the form of tech-
niques that promise some form of control of uncertainty and produce safer
healthcare services. We suggest that such characteristics enhanced the cap-
acity of RCA to recruit practitioners (rather than vice versa). In short, at
some point RCA started to operate as a powerful and well-oiled recruitment
machine.
We can start by noting that in all three of our cases the arrival of RCA
follows what our informants described as “burning decks,” a reference derived
from the heroic poem “Casabianca” by Hemans. In the USA, UK, and Austra-
lia, RCA was introduced in the aftermath of some scandal or large incident,
partly as a way to allay public concern. The use of scandals, inﬂammatory
rhetoric, and scaremongering to promote policy and even product innovation
is well documented (Kitsuse and Spector, 1973). Shankar and Subish (2007) for
example, suggest that one of the favorite ways in which pharmaceutical
companies promote their products is by “creating awareness” about illness.
The resulting anxiety is then used to sell the appropriate treatment (or policy).
While we do not suggest that RCA was artiﬁcially introduced using the same
technique (called disease mongering), we argue the same basic discursive
principle was operating nonetheless. Almost all the documents were con-
structed using the same semiotic strategy. Here is how the Under-Secretary
of State Lord Hunt introduced RCA in 2001:
Today our focus is on patient safety andwith good reasons. Research carried in this
country and independently in Australia and America suggests that 1 in 10 patients
admitted to hospitals suffers an adverse event . . . at least half of these are thought
to be preventable. That’s 1 in 20 patients . . . and the research further suggests that
8% of these 1 in 20% will die as a consequence . . . So Learning from Experience is
the answer. And to unlock the learning from experience we are looking for the real
reasons—the root causes that lie behind these events. (Hunt, 2002: 3–5)
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One can note the artful juxtaposition of anxiety and reassurance in the same
sentence—a typical move á la Greimas that turns RCA into an actant—the
hero of the story.
Once anxiety has been mobilized, RCA can then propose itself as a solu-
tion. It does so by virtue of its historic and discursive lineage. On the one
hand RCA can claim to be derived from the world of engineering, where of
course people are presumed to know what they are doing. If NASA used it,
then it must work (let’s forget about the two lost Shuttles, of course). At the
same time Root Cause Analysis carries with it the reassuring idea of the
possibility to get to the root of the problem, once and for all. The combin-
ation of legacy and discourse turns RCA into a suturing narrative package.
Suturing narratives retell the unfolding of a crisis in terms of beginning,
ending, and points in between thus restoring “a general sense of predictabil-
ity” (Fine and White, 2002: 54). The redemptive nature of the narrative
makes the package both seductive and convincing. It establishes direct
discursive links with the modern fantasy of control over uncertainty and
as such it can enroll and exploit the wider existential anxiety typical of
reﬂexive modernity (Beck, Giddens, and Lash, 1994). In so doing, RCA
latches upon what Power (2007) described as the attempt at risk managing
everything. From this point on RCA starts to align and “collaborate” with
other practices that are part of the same movement. Current instances are
the introduction of systems of clinical governance in hospitals, and quality
assurance of practitioners. Like a snowball, RCA becomes bigger and irresist-
ible by capturing interests and actors. Unlike a snowball, part of the reason
lies in the nature of its variable geometry.
Other characteristics of RCA facilitate its capacity to make proselytes. RCA is
modular and therefore easy to be applied selectively, it is malleable. Experts
like Vincent complain about the pick-and-choose attitude toward this
approach yet this makes it particularly palatable. RCA is also easy to teach—
unlike approaches that require understanding of complex theory, such as the
human error approach.
In sum, RCA as a package actively captures allies and interests by virtue of
its discursive and methodological nature. It operates as an active source of
agential power, although such performative capability is different from the
one we usually attribute to humans as no intentionality is involved. The
right image here would be that of a virus which attaches itself to vulnerable
cells (cells without the appropriate receptors are not susceptible to viruses).
RCA is a viral innovation capable of attaching itself to a sufﬁciently large
number of actors, thanks to its discursive nature and narrative working. It
carries and is carried around by some of the most powerful narratives of
modern times: rationality, science, technology, and the USA. An irresistible
package indeed.
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8.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we examined the global travel of an innovation—RCA. We
found that the success RCA can be partly explained with reference to its
content, that is, its being speciﬁcally framed as an “anxiety-reassurance”
package (Fujimura, 1992). In all the countries we examined what traveled
was not only a structured methodology for investigating incidents (RCA),
but a more complex discursive package. This package concomitantly high-
lighted and ampliﬁed the uncertainty and dangers of medical practice and
offered a reassuring solution, a set of techniques and practices promising
control of uncertainty and producing safer healthcare services. RCA fed on
the broader discourse of the “risk society,” ampliﬁed by the work of a number
of moral entrepreneurs that reiterated the dangers of the healthcare service.
The very anxiety created by the discourse around RCA found its resolution in
the methodology itself: RCA reassures that if correctly implemented, hospitals
will learn from clinical incidents and healthcare services will become safer.
RCA mobilizes the discourse of engineering and its “modernist” focus on
controllability through rational deliberation and technique.
RCA constitutes thus a “standardized theory-method package” (Fujimura,
1992). The idea of a standardized package combines some of the intuitions
behind the notion of “boundary objects”(Star and Griesemer, 1989) with the
idea of “translation” (Latour, 2005). It suggests that the process through
which “an innovation becomes the ruler over a realm” includes a number of
typical steps such as: the labeling of the innovation, the establishment of the
innovation as an obligatory point of passage, the emergence of the innovation
as a distributed center of authority, the establishment of mutual interest
within the network, the search for and the enrolment of new allies, the
standardization of the innovation, the closure of the translation and the
institutionalization of the relative performative composite entity (called
the actor-network because of its capacity to make things happen).
We suggest, however, that particular attention needs to be paid to the
rhetoric and discursive nature of the package itself. Unlike boundary objects,
RCA is not an empty (or semi-empty) signiﬁer or something that can be used
as a projective surface by different groups with only partially overlapping
interests. On the contrary, RCA is a very “full signiﬁer” which operates as a
rhetorical mechanism, capturing interests and practitioners thanks to its cap-
acity to actively mobilize local interests and connect these to wider circuits of
accountability (in our case, the global shift toward the risk management of
everything).
The story of RCA suggests that much is to be gained if we ﬁnd ways of
opening the black box of some modern innovations and study whether there
is indeed a “ghost in the machine.” Albeit we are unlikely to ﬁnd such a ghost,
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we will end up gaining a much better understanding of the inner persuasive
and rhetoric workings of innovations. By addressing the circulation in terms
of “active packages” we contribute to rectifying an imbalance in the current
theorization of the travel of ideas in terms of “translation.” The translation
approach traditionally rejects the idea that innovations are propelled by their
perceived novelty and superior performance, and travel thanks to their inher-
ent innovativeness, as in the diffusion paradigm (Rogers, 1995). On the
contrary, the spread of ideas is driven by actors’ imitation of others as they
pursue their own interests (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska and
Sevón, 2005b). While this approach has the historic merit of providing an
alternative to the diffusion approach, it has tended to see innovations (or
rather a textualized version of them) as intermediaries that actants pass to
each other. Although the theory postulates that the central ideas change as
they travel, the focus is ﬁrmly on the users and their interest rather than the
innovation itself.
We suggest that this focus on actors and their interests prevents us from
asking whether innovation plays an active role in making itself relevant and
compelling for all those touched by it. While for commodities the answer is
likely to be “no,” our case suggests that matters may be different for more
complex innovations and other artifacts that are packaged as “rhetoric” and
“persuasive machines.” A focus on innovations as active packages of theory/
discourse and methods/practice allows us to recover the performative role of
innovations without reverting to the notion that innovations are diffused
thanks to their innovative essence. We argue that in so doing we address an
imbalance in translation theory and respond to Latour’s exhortation that
sociology should populate the world with more active mediators and less
inactive intermediaries (Latour, 2005).
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Notes
1. The “myth of the ghost in the machine” is an expression used by philosopher
Gilbert Ryle (1949) to ridicule Descartes’ view that volitional acts of the body must
be caused by volitional acts of the mind, that is, that mind and body are separate
entities and that the functioning of the former has control over the latter. The
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traditional diffusion approach to the circulation of innovations (Rogers, 1995)
makes more or less the same mistake in that the perceived “innovativeness” of the
new products or practice is supposed to cause its diffusion and take-up. Our tenet
here is that the process translation theory at times goes too far, so that consequential
features of the innovation end up being overlooked.
2. We intentionally use the neutral terms “circulation” and “travel” as the ideas of
transfer, transmission and diffusion are already heavily theory-laden.
3. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which in 2008 also ofﬁcially
adopted RCA as a mandatory approach to apply with serious clinical incidents.
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